This SIP proposes the introduction of the Core Contributor Committee (CCC) to help coordinate and govern the Core Contributors. The CCC will be comprised of existing and former Core Contributors elected to the role by the Core Contributors.
\nThis SIP introduces the Core Contributor Committee which, if implemented, will be responsible for:
\nThe Core Contributors are a critical component to the Synthetix Protocol, ensuring the project has the resources for protocol development. Up until now, the structure of the Core Contributors has been very flat with most of the Core Contributors self-organizing and self-prioritizing protocol work.
\nThis worked in the early stages of the protocol, where most of the Core Contributors worked in the same time-zones with only one or two SIPs being implemented in parallel, however as the number of CC's and SIPs has grown the lack of structure has impeded the scaling of the Synthetix Protocol.
\nThe current structure of the Core Contributors also presents problems in the onboarding and compensation domains, where most of the processes are decided by a few individuals and are often opaque. This structure should be aligned with the rest of the Synthetix Governance system.
\nThe Core Contributor Committee will be made up of three members of the Core Contributors, elected by the Core Contributors. This committee decides (via a ⅔ majority) on a variety of decisions:
\nThe on-boarding of new Core Contributors will be a process of coordination between the
\nThese processes will be made transparent to the the community and other DAOs, with the omission of any information that the Core Contributor Committee deems sensitive.
\nSee Test-Cases for examples
\nThe Core Contributor Committee will be empowered and held responsible for conducting quarterly reviews on the Core Contributors compensation and packages to provide a systematic way of ensuring that the Synthetix Protocol and Core Contributors are aligned.
\nDuring these quarterly reviews, the CCC will need to coordinate with the Treasury Council to adjust the CC budget.
\nFrom the specified budget they will also cover cost they believe to be necessary for the optimal performance of the Core Contributors.
\nSee Test-Cases for examples
\nCore Contributors provide value in non-technical and technical ways, so the CCC will need to be diverse and enough to oversee both domains.
\nSIPs
\nThe CCC will be responsible for acting as a conduit between the Core Contributors and the Spartan Council by conducting weekly meetings with the Spartan Council to convene on the current SIPs in the FEASIBILITY and APPROVED backlog and then discuss the priority of each.
\nThe CCC will then be responsible for assigning leads from those interested in championing the SIPs who will be held accountable and responsible for leading a squad of resources (non-technical and technical) to implementing or perform feasibility assessments to that SIP.
\nDepending on the performance of the lead and squad, the CCC may use its discretion to allocate additional bonuses for their work.
\nIn terms of prioritization, the Core Contributors will also be able to signal on a platform such as canny.io on which SIPs they think are most important, this will help foster a collaborative relationship between the Core Contributors and the CCC.
\nNon-Technical Work
\nWhilst SIPs are predominately for specifying technical protocol work, the non-technical work still remains an important aspect of running a successful protocol. The CCC will be responsible for scoping non-technical work in a similar fashion that is done with technical SIPs, this may require that there be non-technical leaders voted in for the Core Contributor Committee role.
\nProtocol Maintenance Work
\nThe advantages to having Core Contributors who are engaged by the Protocol is that it provides the Protocol with access to resources quickly. Apart from well-defined projects in SIPs, the CCC will also need to schedule resources for ad-hoc tasks like technical upgrades, bug-fixes and other maintenance task in which the SIP process does not account for.
\nFor the long-term sustainability of the Synthetix Protocol, the Core Contributor Committee will be responsible for collecting and discussing ideas for the long-term vision of the Synthetix Protocol. This means that the CCC will be responsible for interfacing with all the Synthetix Governing Bodies and Stakeholders to help synthesize a direction in which the Protocol should aim to follow.
\nThe Core Contributor Committee will be an incentivized role funded by the Treasury Council, the CCC stipends amounts will be openly shared. However, the amounts decided on by the Committee in regards to new and existing Core Contributors will remain accessible by only those involved internally. The CCC Stipends are made transparent so that the CC's have some sort of benchmark in understanding how the CCC are valuing their involvement with the Synthetix Protocol whilst avoiding conflict that may occur within the CC's if all the individual CC stipends were also shared.
\nThe Core Contributor Committee ratification has been formed from a variety of considerations
\nVoting System
\nThe CCC members are voted in by the Core Contributors as they are the ones who are directly influenced by the decisions that are being made, they are the ones who have the most context regarding which individuals would suit the role at a particular time. This results in a positively reinforced feedback system between the Core Contributors and the CCC members.
\nCore Contributor Engagement
\nThe Core Contributor Committee is in the best position to understand which resources are lacking within the Core Contributors and the budget capacity while the existing Core Contributors themselves understand which candidates would be most suitable for the role they are applying for, this vouching system ensures that both parties are responsible for what they know best. This also applies for the disengagement of Core Contributors, since this Committee will be regularly interfacing with the CC's they will have the best understanding of performance.
\nCore Contributor Compensation
\nThe CCC have full discretion over the budget provided by the Treasury Council so they are able to ensure that the Core Contributors incentives allocation is aligned with the Synthetix Protocol priorities defined by the Core Contributor Committee and Spartan Council.
\nCore Contributor Vision and Prioritization
\nSince the Spartan Council is voted on by the Synthetix token holders meaning they are positioned to serve in the best interest of the token holders, there needs to be a mediator between the Spartan Council and the Core Contributors. By positioning the CCC as this mediator, the Spartan Council can have more transparency and discretion over the performance and prioritization of the Core Contributors ensuring they serve in the best interest of the token holders.
\nThe Core Contributor Committee elections will happen every epoch to be aligned with the other DAO bodies epoch length (currently set to 3 months) in a transparent manner.
\nDiscretion in Budgeting
\nThe Core Contributor Committee has received their quarterly budget, upon review it is enough to meet the stipend required for the existing Core Contributors. However, the Core Contributor Committee is planning to hold a Core Contributor Off-Site at Main-net New York as well as sponsor it and realize that they need more funding for this particular quarter.
\nThe Core Contributor Committee schedules a meeting with the Treasury Council in which they request more funding for partnerships and also ancillary cost. The Treasury Council obliges and schedules a transfer of funds to the Core Contributor Committee multi-sig.
\nRoadmap & Priorities
\nThere are 5 SIPs in total sitting in the FEASIBILITY and APPROVED categories in a particular week, when the CCC meet with the Spartan Council they decide that one of the particular approved SIPs is important for the Synthetix Stakers and is time-sensitive. They decide on making this SIP the highest priority and the CCC schedules this in.
\nAnother discussion that comes up is that the Spartan Council has seen a FEASIBILITY SIP that potential solves impermanent loss, they are not sure that this is actually possible and would like to see more evidence and research, they tell the CCC to appoint Billy on this research task.
\nCopyright and related rights waived via CC0.
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